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Abstract
America has been at war for eight long years in Afghanistan with no prospect of a quick or decisive victory in sight. Among the many challenges threatening Afghanistan"s security and stability, insurgency and illicit drugs have coalesced into a virulent threat to the achievement of U.S. strategic objectives. Long tolerated as a separate and minor problem from the insurgency, opium has grown like a cancerous tumor simultaneously feeding the insurgency while starving legitimate economic growth, weakening the Afghan government, and threatening U.S. national security interests and the long-term viability of a stable, democratic Afghanistan.
The failure to discern this symbiotic relationship between the insurgency and the opium trade has proved a major shortcoming of U.S. counterdrug strategy leading to mistakes in its design and operational implementation that persist today. In order to prevail against opium, the U.S. must first, correctly understand the history, background and interactions of the opium-insurgency nexus, second, fix the flaws in its counterdrug approach by eliminating eradication and strengthening alternative development and interdiction, and third, augment Afghan counterdrug forces with U.S. military forces until they are capable of operating independently. This research paper presents the historical, structural, economic, and security causes underlying opium"s resilience. It outlines the opium economy"s functions, and highlights the nature and effects of the opium-insurgency nexus on U.S. and
Afghan efforts to establish functioning state institutions and expand government control.
And finally, the paper analyzes U.S. counterdrug efforts and proposes changes in focus and resource allocation. America has been at war for eight long years in Afghanistan with no prospect of a quick or decisive victory in sight. Among the many challenges threatening Afghanistan"s security and stability, insurgency and illicit drugs have coalesced into a virulent threat to the achievement of U.S. strategic objectives. Long tolerated as a separate and minor problem from the insurgency, opium has grown like a cancerous tumor simultaneously feeding the insurgency while starving legitimate economic growth, weakening the Afghan government, and threatening U.S. national security interests and the long-term viability of a stable and democratic Afghanistan.
INTRODUCTION
The failure to discern this symbiotic relationship between the insurgency and the opium trade has proved a major shortcoming of U.S. counterdrug strategy leading to mistakes in its design and operational implementation that persist today. As the above epigraph points out, if we lose the war against opium we will lose the war against the extremists. In order to prevail against opium the U.S. must first, correctly understand the history, background and interactions of the opium-insurgency nexus, second, fix the flaws in its counterdrug approach by eliminating eradication and strengthening alternative development and interdiction, and third, augment Afghan counterdrug forces with U.S.
military forces until they are capable of operating independently. This research paper presents the historical, structural, economic, and security causes underlying opium"s resilience. It outlines the opium economy"s functions, and highlights the nature and effects of the opium-insurgency nexus on U.S. and Afghan efforts to establish functioning state institutions and expand government control. And finally, the paper analyzes U.S.
counterdrug efforts and proposes changes in focus and resource allocation.
BACKGROUND-OPIUM'S ROOTS
Poverty is frequently cited as the primary driver of opium cultivation; 1 however, it is the dynamic interaction of historical, structural, economic, and security influences that have collectively promoted its growth.
Historical: Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is anything but new, preceding today"s insurgency by centuries. 2 However, Afghanistan"s recent history of back-to-back conflicts beginning with the Soviet"s invasion, followed immediately by civil war, and ending with the Taliban"s oppressive rule in 3 gave opium a powerful boost by wrecking most of the country"s physical infrastructure giving it room to strengthen its roots. These enduring infrastructural deficiencies have retarded the return of resource-intensive, licit agriculture and other economic activities even today.
As Afghanistan grew increasingly insecure and devoid of legitimate economic sources of support, opium became progressively important to the various belligerents in these wars as a means of arming, equipping, and recruiting their forces. This growing dependence on drug-derived revenues only further encouraged the expansion of opium. For example, Hence, at the most elemental level, the decision to grow poppy for most farmers is a purely economic one, which these structural deficiencies serve to reinforce. There are, however, additional economic influences that limit farmers" options and increase the poppy"s appeal. Security: Opium follows insecurity, not the other way around, and often concentrates in the areas of greatest instability where government influence is feeble and the risk-costs associated with production are lower. Afghanistan"s growing lawlessness and instability over the last 30 plus years has provided a perfect transplant host for the international opium trade that was being dismantled in other regions of the world. This shift phenomenon has been likened to a balloon that "when one part is…squeezed, its contents are displaced to
Economic
another." 15 Examples of this include the counterdrug successes of Pakistan and India where reductions in illegal opium production, or conversion to licit pharmaceutical enterprises, helped displace the bulk of the world"s opium cultivation and processing to Afghanistan. 16 This migration started in 1972 following Turkey"s opium ban resulting in a threefold increase in opium produced in Afghanistan from 100 to 300 tons a year between 1979 and 1982. 17 This trend has continued over time as other opium hot-spots, such as Southeast Asia"s infamous "Golden Triangle 18 have declined while world-wide demand remained stable.
Afghanistan is now the world"s largest opium exporter supplying 93 percent of global demand 19 by producing 7,700 tons with an estimated market value of $732 million in 2008.
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THE OPIUM ECONOMY
The opium industry dwarfs all other economic activities in Afghanistan-accounting for over half of 2008"s GDP alone. 21 While its influence impacts all segments of society, those directly profiting from the drug trade fall into one of four categories-farmers, refiners, traffickers, and facilitators-who collectively make up what has been termed the "opium economy." 22 A brief synopsis of each group and their respective role in the opium trade is necessary to accurately assess current U.S. strategy and where it needs to be altered.
Farmers:
The foundation of the opium economy is made up of 2.4 million farmers and day-laborers 23 who share an estimated 20 percent of the profits. 24 While some farmers grow poppy to finance their "upward social mobility," 25 the majority cultivate it out of a lack of legitimate substitutes because often opium "provides the only access to land, credit, water and employment" 26 for many farmers and laborers. As the largest segment of Afghan society (78 percent live in rural areas and the majority of that population is engaged in agriculture) 27 farmers are different from the other groups in another important way as well. In the same manner that the general populace is the center of gravity in counterinsurgency operations, the rural farmer is the center of gravity for counterdrug operations by virtue of his role in the opium economy and his numbers. Because the Afghan farmer remains the political prize in both counterinsurgency and counterdrug contexts, counterdrug operations must be designed to wean, not force, the Afghan farmer away from opium to legal alternatives to prevent driving him to the Taliban and other armed groups for protection against eradication.
Refiners:
In the same way that fuel distillates from crude oil have higher market values than the oil itself, most opium is processed by refiners into its derivatives morphine and heroin because of the greater demand and market value for those drugs over raw opium.
Until the 1990"s most Afghan opium was processed in Pakistan until authorities there made a group is particularly damaging to counterdrug efforts because "often the officials and agencies that are supposed to be part of the solution to corruption are instead a critical part of the corruption syndrome." 34 Corruption not only subverts counterdrug efforts but it also frustrates the administration of justice and damages the government"s legitimacy.
Bribes are paid at all stages of production and transportation, and all levels of the drug industry. For example, farmers often pay bribes to avoid the destruction of their poppy crops, local traffickers pay "tolls" to pass police checkpoints, and minor officials often pay large sums to highly placed influence-peddlers to secure lucrative government postings in drug producing provinces. 
THE OPIUM AND INSURGENCY NEXUS
Over time the insurgency and opium economy have formed a symbiosis that is increasingly at the heart of Afghanistan"s most vexing problems. Levying taxes on all the parts of the drug economy is a commonly practiced way for insurgent groups to profit indirectly from the drug trade, but new information points to a more involved role in the opium trade by these groups. According to the State Department, the Hizb-i
Islami/Gulbuddin (HIG), Taliban, and al-Qaeda are now assessed to be providing logistical support to facilitate money laundering and weapons smuggling, as well directing farmers to grow opium poppy. 37 This recently forged opium-insurgency nexus has given rise to a destructive, self-perpetuating opium-insurgency cycle that further erodes stability and undermines government institutions while strengthening anti-government elements.
The Opium-Insurgency Cycle: Armed groups, poor security, the government, and opium form the major components of the opium-insurgency cycle which is depicted in Figure 1 . The cycle begins with insurgents and related groups diminishing the influence and presence of the legitimate government through violence and illegal activities. As the state grows weaker it loses the ability to impose its rule and provide security for its citizens. As stability gives way to instability, opium becomes more attractive as a crop choice and cultivation flourishes. Large drug profits fund and strengthen these armed groups through the collection of taxes, as well as provide the bribes to corrupt government officials, who in turn protect and facilitate the drug trade. Corruption and the government"s growing impotence provide the breathing room for the opium trade to expand to new areas, generating more profits which strengthen the insurgents while destabilizing the government and perpetuating the cycle.
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The aim of the U.S. "5-pillar" counterdrug strategy is to short-circuit this cycle by addressing the problems created by each stage or part. 
ANALYSIS OF U.S. COUNTERDRUG STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS
The current U.S. counterdrug strategy for Afghanistan consists of five pillars: 1) public information, 2) alternative development, 3) elimination and eradication, 4) interdiction, and 5) law enforcement and justice reform. 39 Although the strategy appears to take a whole-of-government approach, its implementation has not worked for several reasons. First, it is overwhelmingly unbalanced in favor of crop eradication, second, the remaining facets of the strategy are underfunded, and third, it relies on immature and inadequate Afghan forces to carry out counterdrug operations with minimal U.S. assistance.
For the purpose of this paper, analysis will be limited to the alternative development, producing unintended 2 nd and 3 rd order effects that strengthen incentives for future cultivation and promote dispersion to new areas.
First, eradication can produce positive results when it follows economic development, but without it eradication simply deprives farmers of their livelihoods. Unfortunately, too often alternative development programs have not created the necessary conditions to enable opium dependent communities to make the shift without significant economic hardship before eradication is implemented. In these cases, eradication does produce short-term reductions, but they are often offset by increased cultivation levels the following year.
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Furthermore, pre-mature eradication drives the population into the insurgent"s camp as they seek protection against government counterdrug forces.
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Second, eradication compounds a farmers" debt with the loss of his crop. Again, the dearth of viable opium alternatives, together with the salaam credit system produces a causeand-effect cycle 52 where the farmers are all but obliged to plant opium in a desperate attempt to repay growing levels of debt. 53 Indeed, there are instances of farmers repeatedly replanting poppy following several cycles of eradication because opium offers "the only way they can…have any hope of reducing their opium-related debts." 54 Hence, eradication only intensifies a farmers" economic motivation to replant opium at the next opportunity.
Third, eradication exclusively targets the most economically vulnerable part of the opium economy-the Afghan farmer-while perversely increasing profits for the intermediate and top segments further up the chain. In the wake of the Taliban-imposed opium cultivation ban in 2000, "the price of raw opium rose tenfold, from $40-$60 to $400- $600 per kilogram 55 which traffickers were able to capitalize on as they continued trading with pre-existing stocks. As a result, the refiners and traffickers became richer whereas the farmers grew poorer. Another side-effect of this marked inequality in enforcement leads to the erosion of the government"s credibility, driving another wedge between the government and the rural population. 57 And yet, the white paper outlining President Obama"s new strategy for Afghanistan indicates that eradication will remain a central feature of counterdrug efforts for the foreseeable future. 58 The same document, however, hinted at an increased emphasis on interdiction which has the potential to avoid the pitfalls of eradication while targeting those elements of the drug trade that are unlikely to transition to a legal economy.
Interdiction: U.S. joint doctrine defines interdiction from a counterdrug perspective as "actions to divert, disrupt, delay, intercept, board, detain or destroy, as appropriate, annually" 67 -but this falls far short of the drug network"s production capacity which was 7,700 tons in 2008. 68 The U.S. military for its part, however, is not anxious to depart from the status quo of providing support instead of conducting combined interdiction operations.
COUNTERARGUMENTS
Proponents of the current U.S. counterdrug strategy might make the following counterarguments: first, eradication has not been successful because of "artificial" restraints on how it is implemented, and second, drug enforcement is police work and inappropriate for military forces to be involved in because it detracts from more important military missions.
Give Enhanced Eradication a Chance: Supporters of eradication often point to the physical limitations of manual eradication and restrictions on chemical based spraying as the reason it has not worked. 69 This line of reasoning hinges on the supposition that more efficient methods can eliminate more poppy and would therefore be more effective in producing the desired results. This argument, however, ignores the elasticity of the world opium market and the fundamentals of rural Afghan society.
The fluidity of the world"s opium market is such that massive eradication in one area is most likely to result in the displacement of poppy cultivation elsewhere as occurred in
Afghanistan when Pakistan shut down its illicit drug industry. History has shown that the market value of existing opium stocks usually increase following a drop in production as happened after the Taliban"s opium ban where the significantly inflated value of opium stockpiles encouraged farmers to resume poppy cultivation in mass the following year. 70 The likely results of such wide scale eradication would most likely be the enrichment of the traffickers, armed groups, and corrupt government officials, while "selectively" punishing those who grow it resulting in rural populations identifying with the insurgents.
Counterdrugs is Not a Military Mission:
Military and political opposition to greater U.S. military participation remains strong. For example, the current National Security Advisor, General James Jones (ret) opined that counternarcotics was "not a military mission." 71 Likewise, Representative Henry Hyde declared he "did not want our military forces already tasked with the vital counter-terrorism and stability operations to become Afghanistan"s anti-narcotics police."
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The last comment reflects a fear that by going after the drug trade with military forces we will be diverting our efforts from accomplishing the primary task of defeating the insurgency. This 
CONCLUSIONS
Eradication Doesn't Work: Eradication is counterproductive and actually strengthens the opium trade while hampering U.S. and Afghan efforts to stamp it out. This approach has proven ineffective not only in Afghanistan, but in other parts of the world.
Eradication can produce short-term supply reductions, but they are not usually sustainable and often result in a series of unintended consequences that work to increase the motivation for the average Afghan farmer to continue growing poppy. Continuing eradication will increasingly alienate the rural population from the government, strengthen insurgent groups, and increase the time and resources needed to bring this problem to a manageable level.
Alternative Development Works: Alternative development holds the key to permanently breaking opium"s hold on the rural population of Afghanistan because it is the only aspect of counterdrug strategy that can positively address the root causes of poverty and diminish opium"s attractiveness as a crop choice. The U.S. has made significant improvements in providing the necessary programs to develop and sustain the financial, educational, and structural segments of Afghan society, but progress has been uneven throughout the country, and in areas under the insurgent"s control, halting at best.
Afghanistan Needs Help With Interdiction:
Interdiction operations have significant advantages over eradication, but they are not being conducted effectively for two reasons. politicians and military commanders have collectively come to grasp-"that we can"t kill our way to victory" through traditional (kinetic) military operations. 74 Likewise, we can"t eradicate our way to victory against opium, either. By halting eradication its negative consequences for the rural population-deepening debt, loss of income, and ties to the insurgency-can be avoided or mitigated. If retained, it should only be used against those farmers who refuse to abandon poppy where legitimate economic options are available.
Increase Alternative Development: Alternative development funding should be increased relative to its importance in the overall counterdrug campaign and should replace eradication as the centerpiece of U.S. counterdrug strategy. Insecurity throughout much of the country remains a fundamental obstacle limiting the reach and feasibility of many alternative development programs. Almost all (98 percent) of Afghanistan"s opium production is confined to seven provinces 75 with Helmand as the epicenter accounting for 66 percent of total cultivation where Taliban forces control large territories. Consistent with the establishment of basic security and government presence within these hot-spot provinces, new alternative development programs should focus on these areas to begin the process of winning the populations over from opium to a more sustainable economy.
